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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of minimum wage policies on employment, income,
and working time of Chinese workers. Using data from China Health and Nutrition
Survey, we focus on identifying the effects of minimum wage adjustments using a
pre-specified model. We control for lagged minimum wage standard, individual
characteristics, provincial population and economic factors, and fixed effects of
province and year. We find some evidence of minimum wage impacts on wages
and employment for limited groups. Increase of minimum wage has positive effect
on wage income only for low-income workers and has negative employment
effect only for workers in private and individual enterprises. While minimum wage
shortens the average working hours for employed workers, it does not have
significant effect on the relative working times for different income groups. These
findings may imply some beneficial effects of the minimum wage policies for
Chinese workers.
JEL code: J22, J31, J38.
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1 Introduction and policy background
Minimum wage policy has been used in many countries as an instrument to regulate
the labor market. China started to implement such policy since joining ILO’s “Minimum
Wage-Fixing Machinery Convention” in 1984. In November of 1993, China issued a for-
mal government executive order that first set the minimum wage regulations. Since then,
minimum wage standard was first tested in some developed regions such as Shenzhen
and Zhuhai. Some new legislatures served as the earlier framework for minimum wage
policies, including “Regulations on Minimum Wages in Enterprises” and “Labor Law of
the People’s Republic of China”. In March of 2004, when the new “Minimum Wage
Regulation” was issued, minimum wage started to be formally and widely imple-
mented in China, covering all types of enterprises. Since that year, many provinces
set up new minimum wage standards frequently. In 2004 alone, 24 provincial govern-
ments raised their minimum wage standards, with an average increase of 20%. In the
“Labor Contract Act” of 2008, the addition of minimum wage provision further
strengthened the power of minimum wage (MW) policy. After 1 year’s pause of
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minimum wage adjustment during the financial crisis of 2008, the second wave of
frequent MW changes appeared since 2009.
There are a few features worth noticing about minimum wage policies in China. First, the
level of minimum wage is relatively low, about 32% of the workers’ average wages, while the
international ratio of minimum wage to average wage is about 40–60% (Han and Wei
2006). Second, the growth rate of minimum wage is lower than that of average wage, with
their relative ratio reduced from 0.44 in 1995 to 0.31 in 2011 (Du and Pan 2009). This statis-
tical trend is shown in the list of provincial minimum wage standards in Appendix A1. The
effectiveness of minimum wage policy might be limited if the minimum wage standard are
too low compared with the equilibrium market wages. Third, minimum wage standards are
set by provincial governments. The minimum level, frequency, and timing of minimum
wage adjustments may vary between regions. Therefore, studying the minimum wage effects
at the country level is not likely to obtain reliable results.
Minimum wage policies have been long debated among scholars. Some are concerned
that minimum wage will distort resource distribution, reduce efficiency, leading to in-
crease of poverty (e.g., Stigler 1946). Others contend that minimum wage may actually in-
crease employment and income (e.g., Card and Krueger, 1994). Opinions about minimum
wage policies in China are also divided. Zhang (2004) criticizes the minimum wage policy
as a way of price control, reducing China’s industrial competitiveness. Tong (2006), how-
ever, argues that labor cost only accounts for a small part of firms’ production cost in
China, so minimum wage will not significantly affect competitiveness of Chinese firms.
Empirical findings from studies of minimum wage effects in China are not all consist-
ent. Wang and Gunderson (2011, 2012) study the employment effect of minimum wage
using provincial data. They find negative effect of minimum wage on employment in
low-growth regions, especially in firms that are not stately owned. Luo (2007); Luo and
Cong (2009) find that minimum wage reduces employment of migrant workers and
slightly increases wages for all occupations. Xiao and Xiang (2009) study the minimum
wage spillover effect using panel data between 1995 and 2006 from six large cities.
They find that minimum wage can narrow the wage gap for employees.
To further facilitate the debate about minimum wage policies, this paper investigates
minimum wage effects using individual level data from multiple aspects including em-
ployment, income, and with some special attention to working time. The existing litera-
ture in China seems to have focused much on the direct effects of minimum wage on
employment, wage, and firm profit, but rarely on working time of workers except in Jia
(2014). Working time can be used by firms as an adjustment instrument to respond to
the minimum wage policies (Couch and Wittenburg 2001; Linneman 1982). When
hourly minimum wage level is raised, firms can reduce costs through reducing working
hours and increasing work intensity. If minimum wage standard is set for a month,
firms can dilute hourly pay through increasing monthly working hours. It is worth to
investigate whether the minimum wage effect on working time is significant and
whether it has spillover effect on working hours of higher income group.
We combine micro data from China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS, 2004, 2006,
2009, and 2011), provincial minimum wages, macroeconomic and population statistics to
form pooled cross-sectional empirical analysis. Our analyses for minimum wage effect on
wages and income distribution are based on the methodological framework used by
Neumark (2001); Neumark et al. (2004). In the study of spillover effect on working time, we
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extend the method of Neumark et al. (2004) that is originally used for the study of spillover
effect for wages. The channels of wage spillover effect may come from internal substitutions
between workers within a firm and changes in workers’ reservation wages (Neumark, et al.
2004; Flinn 2006; Wang 2012). The same logic also applies to possible spillover effect on
employee’s working time. This paper contributes to the existing literature mainly in three
aspects. Frist, while existing studies in China mostly depend on macro data or very short
panel data sets, our household data observed in 4 years between 2004 and 2011 cover lon-
ger time span, contain more detailed information, and contain more frequent provincial
minimum wage changes. Second, compared with the simple Difference-in-Difference
method traditionally used in minimum wage studies, using method of pooled cross-
sectional analysis makes it possible to analyze effects of multiple minimum wage changes
over time. Third, we fill the gap of minimum wage effect on working time in the existing lit-
erature, especially its possible spillover effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the data sources
and main variables; Section 3 explains the analytical methods; Section 4 and Section 5
report empirical results and robustness check; Section 6 concludes the paper.
2 Data
The data sets used in this paper are drawn from three sources. The individual level data
for employment, wage and working hour are obtained from CHNS. Provincial mini-
mum wages are compiled by the authors from various policy outlets provided by pro-
vincial governments. Macro-economic statistics and population statistics are drawn
from China’s statistical yearbooks. The three groups of data are described as follows.
2.1 Individual level data for workers
CHNS is a household and individual survey jointly conducted by the Carolina Popula-
tion Center at UNC- Chapel Hill and the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Pre-
vention. Nine surveys have been carried out since the first one in 1989, covering nine
representative provinces of China including Liaoning, Shandong and Jiangsu in the east,
Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei and Hunan in the Central region, and Guizhou and
Guangxi in the west. The survey contains information on demographic characteristics,
employment and work, consumption and expenditure, diet and nutrition, health condi-
tion, and leisure time activities. While CHNS has been used mainly for studies of health
related topics, it contains rich information that has allowed for studies of labor issues
(Chen et al. 2014), children’s education (Chyi and Zhou 2014), income inequality (Ward
2014) and many others. Studies on minimum wage issues in China have started to use
micro-level data only in recent years because micro-level data are limited and are often
not publicly available for research. Some studies of MW impact on wages are found
using the Urban Household Survey which was conducted by National Statistics Beauru
of China (NSB) (Wu and Perloff 2005; Fang and Lin 2013), and Rural Migrant Workers’
Monitoring Survey conducted by NSB (Yang and Gunderson 2013). This study makes
use of the information on workers’ working time contained in CHNS. As far as we
know, few studies have studied MW effect on working time.
To investigate the effects of China’s minimum wage policies, we select CHNS data
from 4 years, 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011, covering two waves of minimum wage
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adjustments periods, containing a sample of 15,159 individuals in total. Appendix A2
describes all the variables available for the selected years. Appendix A3 summarizes the
demographic characteristics for different income groups. The summaries indicate that
the sampled observations are distributed rather evenly across different years, regions,
sectors, ages and genders, which is helpful in our analysis for heterogeneity of mini-
mum wage effect among different regions or different groups.
2.2 Minimum wage data
The data for provincial minimum wages (MW) are collected from issued regulations and
documents on adjustments of minimum wage published at the provincial government
websites and news media. These include monthly minimum wage standard, hourly mini-
mum wage standard, and specific implementation time of the new standard. Some prov-
inces have multiple minimum wage levels set for different regions within the province.
Based on the method of Neumark (2001), we use the highest level as the minimum wage
standard for that province. Appendix A4 shows monthly minimum wages of the selected
provinces from 2004 to 2011. As shown by the trends of the two time periods divided by
2008 and 2009, the later period witnesses a more dramatic increase in adjustment fre-
quency, adjustment magnitude, and a larger gap between Eastern, Central and Western
regions compared with the earlier period.
The actual implementation dates of minimum wage adjustments vary between prov-
inces because provincial governments have the discretionary power for implementation
decisions. In order to make annual minimum wage standard in 1 year comparable be-
tween provinces, we follow the method of Rama (2001) and adjust it by computing the
average of the monthly minimum wage weighted by the number of months covered by
that MW standard during the 12 months of that year. The coverage-adjusted annual mini-
mum wage standards are listed in Appendix A5 for the sampled provinces from 2004 to
2011. Over the 7 years’ period, the minimum wage level in different regions increased by
nearly three times. Across regions, the absolute value of the annual minimum wage in the
east is noticeably higher than that in the Central and Western regions. The Central region
has slightly higher minimum wage level than the Western region.
2.3 Provincial macro data
The provincial macro-economic data and population statistics are compiled from national
or regional statistical yearbooks, including major indicators such as per capita GDP, agricul-
tural share of economy in the province, and population of labor force. As Appendix A6
shows, from 2004 to 2011, all provinces experienced a rapid growth in per capita GDP, a
constant decline in the share of agricultural sector, and a relatively stable working popula-
tion. The differences in macro-economic indicators among provinces should be controlled
for in analyzing minimum wage effects.
2.4 Main variables
By compiling the above three sources of data, we forma a panel data set that includes
micro household survey and macro socio-economic statistics in nine provinces of
China in 2004, 2006, 2009 and 2011.
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We mainly analyze three dependent variables, employment, wage income, and weekly
working hour. Working time is reflected both by whether a person is employed or not
and by weekly working hours. We define “employment” (employment = 1) as being en-
gaged in a job under the minimum wage system and being at a working age. Specific-
ally, respondents are supposed to be non-students between 16 and 65 years old,
employed with a positive wage income. They should not be retirees who are re-
employed after retirement. Excluded observations also include farmers, military officers,
soldiers and other unspecified occupations; self-employed, household helpers and those
with unspecified jobs; workers under the household contract responsibility system and
other unspecified sectors. The first column of Appendix A2 shows that the ratio of
employed to popolation has been declining at an average annual rate of 42.27%. Male
labors outnumber female labors, and rural labor force outnumbers the urban one. The
highest proportion of the labor force is the group aged between 30 and 49, followed by
the young adults aged between 16 and 29. In terms of education level, those with a col-
lege degree or higher accounts for the highest proportion of employed. In contrast, only
38% of those with a primary school diploma are employed.
Monthly wage income is our second variable of interest. Within the sampled years, the
monthly wage income has experienced an increase, reaching 2109 RMB yuan in 2011.
The average wage of a male worker is higher than that of a female, and the wage of urban
employees is higher than that of rural employees. Young adults aged between 16 and 29
who have just started their career, and middle-aged people aged between 40 and 59 who
have reached the peak of their career receive the highest income. Those with a college de-
gree or higher receive higher wages than others. The average wage income in Eastern and
Central regions of China is considerably higher than that in the Western regions. Wage
income is also higher for permanent employees than for contract and temporary workers,
and higher for state-owned public institutions, research institutions and government agen-
cies than for collective and privately-owned enterprises.
The third dependent variable of our focus is weekly working hours. Considering the
whole sample, the average working hour per week is 43.5, which is higher than the
statutory cap of 40 h’ working time per week.1 There is no significant difference be-
tween males and females in number of working hours. Yet significant difference is ob-
served between urban and rural areas, with urban employees working shorter hours
than rural employees. Working hours tend to reduce with the age of a worker.
The core independent variable in this study is the ratio of the minimum wage (adjusted
for coverage time) to the average wage. For the whole sample, the ratio is 32.33% on aver-
age1. Contrary to the absolute value of the minimum wage, the relative minimum wage
(minimum wage/average wage) has declined, despite a slight recovery in 2011.
In order to investigate possible spillover effect of minimum wage adjustment on differ-
ent income groups, we divide the workers into seven groups of different income levels ac-
cording to the ratio of their wage relative to the minimum wage, using 20% as the division
range within each group. These six income groups are: less than 90% of minimum wage
(the minimum-income group), 90–110% of minimum wage, 110–130%, 130–150%, 150–
170%, 170–190% and more than 190% of minimum wage. The average proportion of the
seven groups in the sample from 2004 to 2011 is illustrated in Appendix A3. The
minimum-income group accounts for 13% of the sample; high-risk group (whose monthly
wages are between the old and new minimum wage standards) accounts for 8.49%.
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Among the minimum-income group and high-risk group, there are twice female workers
as male workers, and twice rural workers as urban workers. Education level is negatively
related to the probability of falling into the low-income groups. Those with an education
level of lower than primary school is 12 times more likely to belong to the minimum or
high-risk group than those with a college degree or higher. In addition, contract workers,
temporary workers and family workers are more likely to receive a lower wage than per-
manent employees.
3 Methodology
3.1 Overall effect of minimum wage
In analyzing minimum wage effect on employment, scholars typically use the following
time series model (Neumark 2001):
Et ¼ α0 þ α1MWt þ Xtβþ εt ð1Þ
where Et is a dummy for employment status; MWt is the minimum wage adjusted for
coverage time; X is a set of control variables to control economic cycles and effects of
demographic changes; and the subscript t indicates different time periods.
Due to China’s large size and uneven socio-economic development across the coun-
try, using national data undoubtedly conceals large differences in the minimum wage
effects of various regions, which gets in the way of identifying the real impact of mini-
mum wage adjustment. By integrating both micro data and macro data at the provincial
level, we adopt the method of pooled cross-section analysis as seen in Neumark (2001);
Wang and Gunderson (2011). Specifically, we estimate the following model:
Y i;t ¼ α0 þ α1MWi;t þ α2MWi;t‐1 þ Si;tβþ Yeartδ þ Provincei;tλþ εi;t ð2Þ
where Yi,t is the dependent variable; MWi,t is the minimum wage adjusted for coverage
time; MWi,t-1 is the minimum wage adjusted for coverage time in the prior period; si,t is
a set of variables to control for economic cycles and demographic changes; Yeart and
Provincei are fixed effects for year dummies and provinces.
The dependent variables include whether a person has a job (employment), logarithm of
monthly wage (lnwage), and logarithm of weekly working hours (lnhour). For the first
dependent variable, we estimate a Logit model adjusted for heterogeneity in variances. For
the latter two dependent variables, we use the robust ordinary least squares (OLS) method
to estimate for the subsample of workers with a job (employment = 1). In all three esti-
mates, we control for the same regional variables including logarithm of per capita GDP,
share of agriculture in the economy, and logarithm of employed population.
3.2 MW spillover effect on working hours
As we have explained earlier, Neumark et al. (2004) propose an empirical framework to esti-
mate the effect of minimum wage on changes of income distribution. The same framework
can be used to analyze its possible effect on working time for different income groups, i.e.,
spillover effect on working time. Therefore, we use this method to study the different im-
pacts of minimum wage adjustments both on wages and on working hours of employees in
different income, i.e. spillover effect on working time. The estimated model is as follows:
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where subscript i represents individual, s stands for provinces, and t for year. The
dependent variable is the change rate of working hours, with Hist and Hist-1 referring
to the employees’ weekly working hours in current period and prior period respect-
ively. The key independent variables of this model are the change rate of minimum
wage in the current period compared with that of the prior period, and the lagged
change rate of minimum wage of the last period. Specificly, mwst, mwst-1 and mwst-2
represent the provincial minimum wage standards in the current period, the prior
period, and the one before the prior period. Wst-1 is the wage income of the prior
period, and the ratio of Wst-1 to mwst-1 reflects the ratio of wage relative to minimum
wage in the prior period. Dk(wist-1;mSt-1) is a set of dummy variables. As we have ex-
plained earlier, the whole sample is divided into seven groups according to the ratio
of wage to lagged minimum wage. According to Neumark et al. (2004), since the
highest income group is least influenced by minimum wage, and the MW impact on
labor supply and demand for this group is rather indirect, we choose the group with
a wage-MW ratio above 170% as the reference group in the regression and the other
five groups’ dummy variables are added into the model as controlled independent
variables. In addition, X-ist is a group of controlled variables for individual character-
istics including gender, households, age, age squared, and education level; Yearit and
Provinceis are dummy variables for year and province respectively.
In the above model, we pay special attention to the following parameters: βk, γk, δk
and θk; βk measures the impact of increasing minimum wage in the current period on
the group defined by Dk(wist-1;mst-1); γkr measures the impact of increasing minimum
wage in the prior period on this group; δk refers to the fixed effect of different income
groups, measuring the change of working hours of other groups compared to the high-
est income group, or the inter-group inequality of working hours for all employees; θk
refers to the inter-group distribution of working hours of employees with different in-
come levels measured by the ratio of wage to minimum wage, across all income groups
defined by Dk(wist-1;mSt-1).
In analyzing how minimum wage adjustment affects working hours and income, we
need to consider how firms respond to such policy adjustment strategically. In a re-
cent working paper, Maynerisy et al. (2014) find that China’s minimum wage policies
have increased firms’ efficiency, making them adequately respond to the negative im-
pact of MW on output and employment. The increased efficiency comes from the
substitution of low efficiency firms for high efficiency firms. When faced with the
shock of minimum wage increase, firms may use multiple management strategies in-
cluding layoffs, increase or reduction of working hours, cutting benefits, and enhan-
cing technologies. As our study is at the individual level, our focus is on the MW
effect on workers’ working hours and wage income.
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An important methodology issue in this study is measurement errors in the
dependent variables. Income and working hours are measured by average values in a
year while minimum wage adjustments do not always occur at the end of the year.
Therefore, using annual average values do not accurately reflects changes before or
after minimum wage adjustments. We solve this issue in two ways. First, we adjust the
minimum wage standard by weighting it according to the number of months it covers
in a year. Second, we use robust standard errors in our regression analyses to correct
the effects of measurement errors of dependent variables.
4 Results
4.1 Minimum wage effect on employment
We first examine the effect of minimum wage on workers’ employment status. Table 1
reports regression results for the effect of the minimum wage on employment. The
main explanatory variables are the ratio of minimum wage to average income level and
its lag. Column (1) lists the result for the whole sample, while columns (2) to (3) com-
pare the results for Eastern and other regions, and columns (4) and (5) report the re-
sults for coastal and inland regions. The results indicate that minimum wage has made
non-significant effects on employment regionally or nationally. As mentioned above,
one of the explanations for this may be that the minimum wage level is lower than the
average wage and even the equilibrium wage, thus producing little effect on equilibrium
employment.
A possible explanation for the non-significant effect of MW could be due to the
mobility of rural migrant workers in cities included in the sample. Once unemployed,
they may leave for another place or return home, hence unable to be reflected on the
impact of the minimum wage on employment. In addition, as shown by Jia (2014), an
increase of minimum wage may reduce employment more for female workers. There-
fore, we next test the MW effects in urban and rural areas separately, and for male
and female workers separately. The results are reported in Table 2. The effects of
minimum wage are not significant on employment for any of the subgroups.
Characterized by different forms of ownership, firms in China may adopt very differ-
ent management policies in recruiting, layoffs, and wage setup. This may cause the
Table 1 Minimum wage effect on employment (by Region)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Whole Eastern Central/Western Coastal Inland
mw_avg −2.134 0.317 0.778 1.362 −0.0264
(2.241) (2.971) (1.441) (1.832) (1.531)
mw_avg−1 Y Y Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y Y Y
Macro-economic variables,
province dummy, year dummy
Y Y Y Y Y
N 12861 3081 4358 3935 3504
R2 0.13 0.140 0.208 0.163 0.187
mw_avg and mw_avg−1 represent the ratio of minimum wage to average wage and the lagged ratio respectively. Robust
standard errors are in parentheses
Sun et al. IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:19 Page 8 of 22
minimum wage effect to vary for these different types of firms. Table 3 presents MW
effects on employment by firm types. The results indicate that only employees in
private and individual enterprises are affected significantly and negatively.
We next examine possible effects from firms’ strategies of adjusting labor cost
through types of employment. With a fixed number of employees, a rise in the mini-
mum wage leads to an increase of long-run cost. Being aware of that, firms may replace
regular employees with temporary workers, which can reduce the cost caused by regu-
lar employees with unsaturated workload and in the meantime offset the effect of mini-
mum wage increase. Nevertheless, the cost of adjusting employees may limit the
impact of the minimum wage on firms’ employment decisions. Table 4 reports the
regression results for regular, contract, or temporary workers. The results show that
employment effect of minimum wage is not significant for any of the three types of
workers.
4.2 MW effect on employees’ income
The minimum wage effect on income is not easy to predict. While it can increase the
income of employees who use to earn lower than the MW level, it can also reduce in-
come for those who use to earn higher than the MW level due to the firm’s intention
to offset increased labor cost in the lower end. We examine the effects first for the
whole sample and then by regions and other demographic groups.
Table 2 Minimum wage effect on employment (by Gender and Hukou)
Urban Hukou Rural Hukou
Male Female Male Female
mw_avg −5.316 −4.770 −0.730 −4.598
(3.676) (4.110) (3.312) (4.080)
mw_avg−1 Y Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y Y
Macro-economic variables,
province dummy, year dummy
Y Y Y Y
N 4083 3170 8777 7131
Pseudo R2 0.021 0.020 0.046 0.065
Robust standard errors are in parentheses











mw_avg 19.03 −16.55 28.02 −19.26 −7.616** −8.731
(13.76) (15.24) (18.20) (12.62) (3.139) (37.79)
mw_avg−1 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Macro-economic variables, province
dummy, year dummy
Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 501 1632 853 797 5883 216
Pseudo R2 0.038 0.050 0.069 0.071 0.027 0.132
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. ** denotes p <0.05
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Table 5 reports the results of the whole sample and by regions. As shown in column
(1), the minimum wage variables do not have significant effect on average income for
the whole sample. We also perform the same analysis for different regions and find no
significant effects as shown in other columns.
We next examine the minimum wage effect on lower-income employees, with the re-
sults reported in Table 6. A rise in minimum wage increases income for the lowest in-
come group and the high-risk group, which is in line with the results obtained by
Grossman (1983); Ma et al. (2012) from different data in China. Compare these results
with those in Table 5, the non-significant effect for the whole sample could be due to
the fact that the effect is not significant for the high-income groups.
Table 7 reports the results of MW income effects by gender. Females with lowest
income or with high risk respond strongly to the increase of minimum wage.
Income of lower-paid females with rural hukou increases significantly with MW
adjustment (p <0.01), with a magnitude twice as much as that of males. In urban
areas, minimum wage effect on income is not significant for males or females,
which is probably because income level is relatively high already for these groups
before MW increases.
4.3 MW effect on working hours
The above analyses indicate that while higher minimum wages do not result in
more job losses, they increase the earnings of low-income workers. If minimum
Table 4 Minimum wage effect on employment (by Employment Type)
Regular employment Contract employment Temporary worker
mw_avg −5.898 −1.244 8.987
(6.874) (9.940) (7.385)
mw_avg−1 Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y
Macro-economic variables,
province dummy, year dummy
Y Y Y
N 3746 1526 2019
Pseudo R2 0.023 0.033 0.017
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
Table 5 Minimum wage effect on income (by Region)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Whole Eastern Central/Western Costal Inland
mw_avg 1.433 0.317 0.778 1.362 −0.0264
(1.126) (2.971) (1.441) (1.832) (1.531)
mw_avg−1 Y Y Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y Y Y
Macro-economic variables, province dummy, year dummy Y Y Y Y Y
N 4498 6126 12485 8637 9974
R2 0.187 0.046 0.010 0.041 0.014
Robust standard errors are in parentheses
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wage increases firms’ labor cost, how do they respond to it? Since staff turnover
can lead to higher costs, the employer may find it more desirable to cut working
hours to offset the rise of minimum wage instead of cutting the number of staff.
The minimum wage effect on working hours can be of crucial importance and
may exist for two reasons. First, due to weak enforcement and loopholes in laws
and regulations, some employers may increase working hours in one way or an-
other in order to make up the cost increase resulted from meeting the minimum
standard. Second, since the government has set definite minimum hourly wages
since 2007, some employers may reconsider their policies on staffing size, work-
ing hours, and types of employment (permanent staff, contract workers, tempor-
ary workers, etc.), and cut down high-cost working hours in order to reduce
labor cost.
Table 8 reports the results of our analysis for working time. The results seem to sup-
port the second point above: an increased minimum wage leads to a general decline of
working hours for Chinese workers, which is consistent with the findings of Machin et
al. (2003); Stewart and Swaffield (2008).
We next compare the MW effect on working time for urban and rural labor forces.
Table 9 shows that, the decline in working hours of rural workers is greater than that
of the urban ones, and that working hours are reduced more for rural female workers
than for their male counterparts. These may suggest that setting minimum wages has
caused the employers to alter their working arrangements, and has led to better pays,
and fewer working hours.
Table 6 Minimum wage effect on income (by Income Level)




Individual characteristics Y Y
Macro-economic variables,




The lowest income group refers to those within the 90% of minimum wage level. Robust standard errors are in
parentheses. *** denotes p <0.01
Table 7 Minimum wage effect on income (by Gender and Hukou)
Whole Urban Hukou Rural Hukou
Male Female Male female male Female
mw_avg 1.433 2.242* 1.225 0.269 2.501 5.683***
(1.126) (1.285) (1.356) (1.549) (1.922) (2.132)
mw_avg−1 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Macro-economic variables, province dummy, year dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 4498 2940 2615 1861 1882 1079
R2 0.187 0.184 0.195 0.225 0.198 0.204
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.* denotes p <0.10, *** denotes p <0.01
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4.4 Spillover effect on working hours
The above analysis shows that increase of minimum wage shortens average working
hours. In this section, we investigate whether MW increase also has a distribution or
spillover effect on working hours as it does to workers’ income (Stewart, 2012). It is
possible that when minimum wage is increased, due to management’s adjustments,
working loads or hours of certain income groups are significantly increased while other
groups are not significantly affected.
We use the same method of Neumark et al. (2004) as we used in section 3.2 when analyz-
ing MW effect on income. The dependent variable is now the working hours of a worker.
The target sample contains only employed workers. We perform the analysis for the whole
sample and for different groups. For group analysis, we divide the whole sample according
to worker’s gender, hukou status, type of firm a worker is employed for, type of employment
contract, and the region of residence.
Our main estimation interest is the interaction of minimum wage change and the dummy
of a worker’s income group. The results indicate the following: minimum wage adjustment
does not have significant effect on the relative working hours for different income groups;
the results are similar when the analysis is conducted by gender, hukou, contract type, and
regions. Two explanations are possible for this finding. First, while increase of minimum
wage directly increases the labor cost for employment of low wage workers, it could have
indirectly increased the labor cost for the whole labor force, thus reduced average working
hours. Second, reference effect between workers can lead to the reduction of average work-
ing hours for the whole labor force when workers compare themselves with hours of others.
Table 8 Minimum wage effect on work time (by Region)
(1) (2) (3)
Whole Eastern Central/Western
mw_avg −2.073** −7.102*** −1.758*
(0.834) (2.533) (1.011)
mw_avg−1 Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y
Macro-economic variables, province dummy, year dummy Y Y Y
N 10500 3081 4358
R2 0.020 0.140 0.208
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.* denotes p <0.10, ** denotes p <0.05, *** denotes p <0.01
Table 9 Minimum wage effect on work time (by Gender and Hukou)
Whole Urban Hukou Rural Hukou
Male Female Male Female male female
mw_avg −2.073** −3.425*** −1.834** −1.885* −2.064* −3.648***
(0.834) (1.013) (0.932) (1.129) (1.164) (1.351)
mw_avg−1 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Macro-economic variables, province dummy,
year dummy
Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 10500 8110 3271 2385 7228 5725
R2 0.020 0.027 0.014 0.021 0.021 0.033
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes p <0.10, ** denotes p <0.05, *** denotes p <0.01
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In the analysis by firm type, we find that only in collective business firms, working hours of
low wage workers are significantly lowered by minimum wage adjustment. Hours distribu-
tions in other firm types including government agency, state owned public units, state
owned business, and private business are not significantly affected. The income of workers
is lowest in collective business compared with those in other firms. Since collective business
has the most flexible employment institution, minimum wage may affect working hours of
the low wage workers the strongest in these firms.
There are many possible ways of dividing a target group into different income groups.
Considering that dividing into too many groups may reduce the sample size in each group,
we eventually choose to report the results of dividing the sample into three income groups:
lower than 110% of MW, between 110 and 170% of MW, and higher than 170% of MW.
Table 10 shows the results by division of income and by firm type. Other estimations for
the whole sample and for groups are omitted as we have summarized the main findings and
do not find significant MW distribution effect on working hours.
5 Robustness check
In the above analyses of minimum wage effect on employment, wages, and working hours,
we have followed previous literature and have used minimum wage standards adjusted by
coverage months as the explanatory variables. However, the boundary of such adjustments
is not clear cut. We check the robustness of the results by substituting the logarithms of
the absolute values of the current and previous minimum wages for the previous two ex-
planatory variables. We report only the results by genders in Table 11.2
With previous minimum wage controlled for, the minimum wage adjustment does
not affect employment significantly, but increases wage significantly, and slightly more
so for females than for males. The last two columns show that minimum wage increase
significantly reduces working hours for females by 4.7%, but does not affect male
workers’ hours significantly. Thus the result of the robustness check is largely consist-
ent with our earlier analyses and supports similar conclusions.
6 Conclusion
This paper investigates the minimum wage effect on employment, wages, and working
hours using a pre-specified model controlling minimum wage of the previous period,
Table 10 Spillover effects of MW on working hours(by Firm Type)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
<110% MW 8.234 −1.225 1.135 −1.961* 1.672 −6.162
(9.749) (0.944) (1.149) (1.133) (1.665) (6.030)
110–170%MW 41.34 −0.393 −0.612 1.272 0.567 1.222
(37.94) (0.462) (0.465) (1.659) (1.442) (2.258)
Control variables Y Y Y Y Y Y
_cons −18.61 −1.446*** −0.116 −1.408* −1.093 −5.185
(15.12) (0.413) (0.717) (0.820) (1.985) (4.540)
N 164 654 252 220 601 61
R2 0.195 0.058 0.147 0.156 0.093 0.326
Columns (1)–(6): (1) government agency; (2) state non-business; (3) state corporate business; (4) collective business; (5)
individually owned business; (6) joint-ventures and others. Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p <0.10, *** p <0.01
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individual characteristics, provincial characteristics, and fixed effects of provinces and years.
We find that minimum wages have contributions to wage increases, especially for low-
income workers, such as female workers and those with rural hukou. Increase of minimum
wage has negative employment effect only for workers in private and individual enterprises.
Minimum wage adjustments have also significantly reduced working hours of employed
workers, especially for women. This implies that, without significant impact on total pro-
duction, minimum wages have the potential of increasing the welfare for the low-income
workers.
Endnotes
1There are few existing surveys that contain information about working hours. An-
other survey with such information is RUMIC (Rural–urban Migration in China) with
which we have obtained an average of 59 weekly working hours. Since RUMIC focuses
on migrant workers, the difference between the two data sets implies that migrant
workers work longer hours than the average of those workers in CHNS that include
both migrant workers and urban workers. Workers in both data sets work longer than
the legal cap 40 h probably because they contain migrant workers.
2All the analyses for different subgroups we performed earlier stood the robustness check.
Given the limited space, only regression results classified by gender are listed in the table.
Appendix
Table 11 Robustness check
Employment Income Working hours
Male Female Male Female Male Female
Lnmw −0.201 −0.822 0.604** 0.816*** −0.293 −0.473*
(0.543) (0.626) (0.280) (0.304) (0.209) (0.253)
lnmw−1 Y Y Y Y Y Y
Individual characteristics Y Y Y Y Y Y
Macro-economic variables, province dummy, year dummy Y Y Y Y Y Y
N 12861 10301 4498 2940 10500 8110
R2 0.027 0.027 0.188 0.185 0.019 0.026
Robust standard errors are in parentheses. * denotes p <0.10, ** denotes p <0.05, *** denotes p <0.01
Table 12 Ratio of minimum wage to average wage by region (2004–2011)
Eastern Central Western
Liaoning Shandong Jiangsu Heilongjiang Henan Hubei Hunan Guangxi Guizhou
2004 0.30 0.37 0.38 0.34 0.38 0.40 0.37 0.33 0.35
2005 0.31 0.32 0.36 0.38 0.34 0.37 0.36 0.36 0.33
2006 0.33 0.40 0.36 0.34 0.34 0.34 0.36 0.31 0.31
2007 0.31 0.38 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.34 0.34 0.28 0.33
2008 0.30 0.35 0.32 0.35 0.31 0.33 0.31 0.29 0.32
2009 0.27 0.31 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.29 0.28 0.28
2010 0.27 0.32 0.28 0.31 0.29 0.31 0.30 0.27 0.27
2011 0.31 0.32 0.29 0.34 0.31 0.34 0.32 0.29 0.28
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Table 13 Descriptive statistics
Proportion of employed
in population




Whole sample 42.27% 1478.9 43.5 32.33%
Waves
2004 50.07% 861.8 43.6 35.90%
2006 40.73% 1072.9 44.6 34.11%
2009 40.11% 1717.8 43.3 28.97%
2011 39.13% 2109.5 42.6 30.79%
Gender
Male 47.72% 1609.2 43.6 32.40%
Female 36.99% 1289.2 43.4 32.27%
Hukoua
Urban 51.89% 1572.2 42.5 32.60%
Rural 70.66% 1282.4 45.2 32.48%
Age cohorts
16–29 75.72% 1672.4 45.6 32.74%
30–39 82.73% 1426.2 44.7 32.83%
40–49 80.78% 1623.5 43.5 32.60%
50–59 64.03% 1603.2 41.9 32.55%
60–65 44.08% 1389.7 42.8 32.19%
Education attainment
Illiteracy 38.25% 943.6 39.9 32.55%
Primary 69.34% 1096.0 42.3 32.43%
Junior high school 71.23% 1369.1 45.3 32.54%
Senior high school 69.73% 1457.8 41.9 32.97%
Vocational college 66.80% 1478.7 42.3 32.87%
University or above 75.36% 2101.0 39.8 32.65%
Region
Eastern Shandong 42.21% 1344.6 33.28 42.21%
Liaoning 42.00% 1594.8 30.19 42.00%
Jiangsu 49.22% 1480.3 32.84 49.22%
Central Hunan 34.56% 1738.7 33.30 34.56%
Hubei 38.48% 1369.3 34.90 38.48%
Henan 40.95% 1249.4 32.53 40.95%
Heilongjiang 53.74% 1865.3 34.77 53.74%
Western Guizhou 39.60% 1612.8 30.31 39.60%
Guangxi 43.44% 1046.3 30.21 43.44%
Employment type
Regular – 1638.2 42.2 32.81%
Contract – 1363.6 43.4 31.93%
Temporary – 1118.2 46.2 32.13%
Enterprise
Government – 1630.0 38.1 32.48%
Shiye unit – 1836.7 39.4 32.73%
SOE – 1411.9 42.7 33.11%
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Table 13 Descriptive statistics (Continued)
Collective firms – 1258.6 44.6 33.07%
Private firms – 1296.6 46.5 32.60%
Foreign enterprises – 1491.8 43.9 32.13%
aNote that in the whole sample of 74750 observations, there are 24975 of them who are missing information about
Hukou, which is why the proportion counts in this category are higher than the average of the whole sample
Table 14 Demographic summary by income level
Observation <90% 90–110% 110–130% 130–150% 150–170% 170–190% 190%
above
Whole sample 15159 13.02% 8.49% 8.78% 10.28% 6.65% 10.43% 42.35%
Waves
2004 3336 13.77% 7.93% 7.73% 9.33% 7.10% 9.52% 44.61%
2006 3484 14.68% 9.36% 9.67% 10.34% 7.43% 11.95% 36.57%
2009 4172 11.35% 7.75% 10.39% 10.54% 6.29% 8.78% 44.90%
2011 4167 12.67% 8.93% 7.24% 10.70% 5.97% 11.51% 42.97%
Gender
Male 9598 8.91% 6.26% 7.70% 9.83% 6.61% 11.52% 49.17%
Female 5559 19.28% 11.88% 10.42% 10.95% 6.68% 8.78% 31.99%
Hukou
Urban 9856 9.77% 7.27% 7.69% 8.74% 6.05% 10.10% 50.39%
Rural 5294 18.36% 10.52% 10.57% 12.83% 7.65% 10.97% 29.10%
Age cohort
16–29 2526 9.18% 8.18% 11.49% 13.48% 10.36% 13.73% 33.58%
30–39 3990 10.80% 8.75% 7.66% 11.97% 6.89% 12.25% 41.68%
40–49 5240 12.67% 8.34% 9.04% 8.77% 5.69% 9.29% 46.20%
50–59 2932 15.30% 8.17% 7.57% 8.22% 5.26% 7.95% 47.53%
60–65 313 34.20% 13.85% 8.66% 7.79% 3.46% 5.63% 26.41%
Education attainment
Illiteracy 179 40.28% 16.67% 8.33% 10.42% 4.17% 4.17% 15.97%
Primary 1609 27.02% 12.02% 12.45% 11.34% 6.05% 8.95% 22.17%
Junior high school 4886 16.09% 10.39% 11.06% 12.72% 7.48% 11.34% 30.92%
Senior high school 2997 11.45% 9.65% 9.28% 10.71% 7.26% 11.24% 40.40%
Vocational college 2605 6.30% 4.96% 5.57% 8.45% 7.18% 11.13% 56.41%
University or above 2858 1.69% 3.06% 3.71% 5.60% 4.29% 8.39% 73.26%
Region
Eastern Shandong 1723 14.50% 10.98% 8.17% 14.94% 7.91% 11.42% 32.07%
Liaoning 1855 12.06% 7.60% 6.08% 8.49% 8.13% 8.94% 48.70%
Jiangsu 2480 21.54% 9.32% 11.28% 10.68% 3.68% 14.48% 29.02%
Central Hunan 1556 6.17% 5.39% 7.86% 5.95% 8.75% 10.44% 55.44%
Hubei 1496 11.33% 9.06% 8.20% 10.03% 7.44% 8.74% 45.20%
Henan 1403 12.70% 8.58% 9.61% 8.58% 9.73% 9.38% 41.42%
Heilongjiang 1797 5.78% 3.78% 5.18% 6.27% 3.49% 9.96% 65.54%
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Table 14 Demographic summary by income level (Continued)
Western Guizhou 1318 7.37% 7.62% 7.75% 9.78% 6.10% 8.39% 52.99%
Guangxi 1531 17.36% 12.47% 13.02% 15.79% 6.83% 8.86% 25.67%
Employment type
Regular 8001 7.14% 5.44% 6.13% 8.63% 6.73% 10.32% 55.61%
Contract 2422 12.77% 9.04% 11.69% 13.40% 6.89% 13.97% 32.24%
Temporary 2191 24.53% 16.70% 12.99% 12.75% 6.62% 8.26% 18.15%
Enterprise
Government 1027 14.09% 4.92% 6.28% 0.34% 6.79% 7.47% 60.10%
Shiye unit 3600 5.07% 3.21% 3.78% 1.60% 4.76% 7.82% 73.76%
SOE 1867 8.78% 7.54% 9.66% 8.51% 7.27% 12.06% 46.19%
Collective firms 1323 17.63% 13.14% 10.62% 13.69% 7.67% 13.36% 23.88%
Private firms 5517 14.71% 10.19% 11.36% 13.41% 7.08% 10.95% 32.29%
Foreign enterprises 408 5.95% 7.54% 11.51% 13.10% 8.33% 20.63% 32.94%
<90%, 90–110%, 110–130%, 130–150%, 150–170%, 170–190% and 190% above denote the ratios of minimum wage to
monthly wage
Table 15 2004–2011 monthly minimum wage standard
Year Month Eastern Central Western
Liaoning Shandong Jiangsu Heilongjiang Henan Hubei Hunan Guangxi Guizhou
2004 1 360 410 540 390 380 400 400 340 350
2 360 410 540 390 380 400 400 340 350
3 360 410 540 390 380 400 400 340 350
4 360 410 540 390 380 400 400 340 350
5 360 410 540 390 380 400 400 340 350
6 360 410 540 390 380 400 400 340 350
7 360 410 620 390 380 400 460 340 350
8 360 410 620 390 380 400 460 340 350
9 360 410 620 390 380 400 460 340 350
10 360 410 620 390 380 400 460 460 400
11 450 410 620 390 380 400 460 460 400
12 450 410 620 390 380 400 460 460 400
2005 1 450 530 620 390 380 400 460 460 400
2 450 530 620 390 380 400 460 460 400
3 450 530 620 390 380 460 460 460 400
4 450 530 620 390 380 460 460 460 400
5 450 530 620 390 380 460 460 460 400
6 450 530 620 390 380 460 460 460 400
7 450 530 620 390 380 460 480 460 400
8 450 530 620 390 380 460 480 460 400
9 450 530 620 390 380 460 480 460 400
10 450 530 620 390 480 460 480 460 400
11 450 530 690 390 480 460 480 460 400
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Table 15 2004–2011 monthly minimum wage standard (Continued)
12 450 530 690 390 480 460 480 460 400
2006 1 450 530 690 390 480 460 480 460 400
2 450 530 690 390 480 460 480 460 400
3 450 530 690 390 480 460 480 460 400
4 450 530 690 390 480 460 480 460 400
5 450 530 690 620 480 460 480 460 400
6 590 530 690 620 480 460 480 460 400
7 590 530 690 620 480 460 600 460 400
8 590 530 690 620 480 460 600 460 400
9 590 530 690 620 480 460 600 500 400
10 590 610 750 620 480 460 600 500 550
11 590 610 750 620 480 460 600 500 550
12 590 610 750 620 480 460 600 500 550
2007 1 590 610 750 620 480 460 600 500 550
2 590 610 750 620 480 460 600 500 550
3 590 610 750 620 480 580 600 500 550
4 590 610 750 620 480 580 600 500 550
5 590 610 750 620 480 580 600 500 550
6 590 610 750 620 480 580 600 500 550
7 590 610 750 620 480 580 635 500 550
8 590 610 750 620 480 580 635 500 550
9 590 610 750 620 480 580 635 500 550
10 590 610 850 620 650 580 635 500 550
11 590 610 850 620 650 580 635 580 650
12 590 610 850 620 650 580 635 580 650
2008 1 700 760 850 680 650 580 635 580 650
2 700 760 850 680 650 580 635 580 650
3 700 760 850 680 650 580 635 580 650
4 700 760 850 680 650 580 635 580 650
5 700 760 850 680 650 580 635 580 650
6 700 760 850 680 650 580 635 580 650
7 700 760 850 680 650 580 665 580 650
8 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
9 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
10 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
11 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
12 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
2009 1 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
2 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
3 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
4 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
5 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
6 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
7 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
8 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
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Table 15 2004–2011 monthly minimum wage standard (Continued)
9 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
10 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
11 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
12 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
2010 1 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
2 700 760 960 680 650 700 665 670 650
3 700 760 960 680 650 700 665 670 650
4 700 760 960 680 650 700 665 670 650
5 700 920 960 680 650 900 665 670 650
6 700 920 960 680 650 900 665 670 650
7 900 920 960 880 800 900 850 670 650
8 900 920 960 880 800 900 850 670 650
9 900 920 960 880 800 900 850 820 830
10 900 920 960 880 800 900 850 820 830
11 900 920 960 880 800 900 850 820 830
12 900 920 960 880 800 900 850 820 830
2011 1 900 920 960 880 800 900 850 820 830
2 900 920 1140 880 800 900 850 820 830
3 900 1100 1140 880 800 900 850 820 830
4 900 1100 1140 880 800 900 850 820 830
5 900 1100 1140 880 800 900 850 820 830
6 900 1100 1140 880 800 900 850 820 830
7 1100 1100 1140 880 800 900 1020 820 830
8 1100 1100 1140 880 800 900 1020 820 930
9 1100 1100 1140 880 800 900 1020 820 930
10 1100 1100 1140 880 1080 900 1020 820 930
11 1100 1100 1140 880 1080 900 1020 820 930
12 1100 1100 1140 880 1080 1100 1020 820 930
Table 16 2004–2011 weighted monthly minimum wage standard
Year Eastern Central Western
Liaoning Shandong Jiangsu Heilongjiang Henan Hubei Hunan Guangxi Guizhou
2004 375 410 580 390 380 400 430 370 363
2005 450 530 632 390 405 450 470 460 400
2006 532 550 705 543 480 460 540 473 438
2007 590 610 775 620 523 560 618 513 567
2008 700 760 850 680 650 630 650 618 650
2009 700 760 850 680 650 700 665 670 650
2010 800 867 951 780 725 833 758 720 710
2011 1000 1070 1125 880 870 917 935 820 872
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Table 17 Macro economic variables
variables Year Eastern Central Western
Liaoning Shandong Jiangsu Heilongjiang Henan Hubei Hunan Guangxi Guizhou
GDP per capita (RMB yuan) 2004 14258.9 10635.4 16708.2 13236.3 7104.3 8368.4 6993.8 5631.3 3685.6
2005 15821.7 12445.9 20620.0 16874.4 8802.9 9886.3 8423.3 7022.9 4297.6
2006 19064.9 14433.8 24510.7 20022.7 11287.2 11541.5 10427.0 8746.8 5376.5
2007 21785.3 16261.6 28398.8 23716.2 13304.9 13380.5 12123.5 10233.1 6338.7
2008 31676.9 21736.9 39914.9 32848.3 19109.7 19837.0 18111.3 14578.5 9904.2
2009 35043.7 22443.8 44119.5 35793.7 20533.8 22659.3 20386.7 15978.5 11062.1
2010 42188.0 27050.9 52643.9 40853.1 24553.3 27876.4 24410.9 20758.9 13228.4
2011 50711.2 32816.9 62172.8 47070.5 28686.7 34095.6 29820.4 25233.3 16436.6
Agricultural product in GDP (%) 2004 12.00 11.80 9.12 12.50 19.30 18.10 18.10 23.82 21.00
2005 11.00 10.70 8.00 12.42 17.90 16.60 16.70 22.90 18.60
2006 10.60 9.80 7.20 12.10 15.50 15.20 16.50 21.80 17.30
2007 10.20 9.70 7.10 13.00 14.80 14.80 17.20 21.50 16.30
2008 9.70 9.70 6.93 13.11 14.80 15.71 16.40 20.71 16.44
2009 9.40 9.50 6.60 13.40 14.30 14.00 15.20 18.90 14.20
2010 8.90 9.20 6.20 12.70 14.20 13.60 14.70 17.60 13.70
2011 8.70 8.80 6.30 13.60 13.00 13.10 14.10 17.50 12.70
Employed population (10 thousand persons) 2004 4217 9180 7523 3817 9717 5698 6698 4889 3904
2005 4221 9248 7588 3820 9380 5710 6326 4660 3730
2006 4271 9309 7656 3823 9392 5693 6342 4719 3690
2007 4298 9367 7723 3824 9360 5699 6355 4768 3632















Table 17 Macro economic variables (Continued)
2009 4341 9470 7810 3826 9487 5720 6406 4856 3537
2010 4375 9588 7869 3833 9405 5728 6570 4610 3479
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